But what do we know (what can we know) of such claims? Is it Robespierre's terror, or some other terror, closer to home, a terror authorized by a metaphysical or theological claim that dares to link human violence and infinite justice? 4 Little did I imagine when I began this meditation on law's legitimacy that I would need to grapple with words uttered by the president of the United States. Who would have thought that an American president might implicate Nietzsche's pivotal idea, the will to power? But that is precisely what happened when President Bush addressed the nation following the terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center in New York City. Here are the words the president used to describe the perpetrators of those terrible acts: "By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions-by abandoning every value except the will to power-they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. ' I believe that this linkage between terrorist violence and the will to power is mistaken, but not accidental. It is mistaken, as I shall presently explain in more detail, because Nietzsche's thinking about the will to power, properly understood, is precisely the opposite of metaphysical violence. This mistake may not be accidental to the extent that it reflects the speaker's adoption of metaphysical ideas. 6 My objective here is an urgent one. I seek not only to extricate Nietzsche's highest thought from confusion, but also to rescue law's legitimacy from the grip of metaphysical beatitude. If law finds legitimacy in beatitude, and I shall contend that it does, then we must learn to distinguish between the joyous excess and life affirmation that characterize Nietzsche's beatitude from the pathology of denial, nihilism, and resentment that characterize metaphysical beatitude. The difference is a matter of life and death.
I. METAPHYSICAL BEATITUDE Metaphysical beatitude begins in denial. It signals a rebellion against life. Franz Rosenzweig wrote about this experience in 1921. He described it as the paralysis of "sick reason." 7 It is what happens when one catches the disease of metaphysics-that pathological obsession with essences. "Common sense is crippled by a stroke." 8 Within a year after Rosenzweig penned those words, Franz Kafka conjured a world of sick reason in a parable of alienation and disenchantment. In his novel The Castle, 9 only the necessity of authority remains; its significance has been lost.' 0 In the midst of Kafka's bureaucratic labyrinth, law retains validity but lacks meaning. The source of law's legitimacy is no longer apparent. We have been cut off."
The same year, 1921, Walter Benjamin wrote: "[I]n the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence 7 ROSENWEIG, supra note 6, at 42. 8 Id. 10 See GERSHOM SCHOLEM, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF WALTER BENJAMIN AND GERSHOM SCHOLEM 1932 SCHOLEM -1940 , at 142 (G. Scholem ed., Anson Rabinbach trans., 1992) (describing the "nothingness of revelation" as "a state in which revelation appears to be without meaning, in which it still asserts itself, in which it has validity but no significance.").
See ERIC L. SANTNER, ON THE PSYCHOTHEOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE:
REFLECTIONS ON FREUD AND ROSENZWEIG 38-39 (2001) (linking the "nothingness of revelation" with trauma-"a breakdown in meaning" that leaves the mind "possessed or haunted, under the 'ban' of something that profoundly matters without... anything resembling an orientation in the world"); see also WEBER, supra note 1, at 506 ("As intellectualism suppresses belief in magic, the world's processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, and henceforth simply 'are' and 'happen' but no longer signify anything.").
something rotten in law is revealed." 2 "What manifests itself," as Eric Santner astutely observes:
[I1s the fact that the rule of law is, in the final analysis, without ultimate justification or legitimation, that the very space of juridical reason within which the rule of law obtains is established and sustained by a dimension of force and violence that, as it were, holds the place of those missing foundations. 3 In this view, the "mystical foundation of authority," to cite Jacques Derrida's gloss on Montaigne's phrase, 14 remains a mystery, or worse, a repressed trauma of unjustifiable violence." i Writing in the aftermath of the First World War, Kafka, Rosenzweig, and Benjamin were grappling with the pervasive effects of profound trauma. So, too, was Sigmund Freud, 6 whose Beyond the Pleasure Principle appeared in 1920. 1 He too described sick reason and the loss of meaning. In psychoanalytic terms, trauma occurs when there is a "hyper-cathexis" (or overinvestment) of excess unbound psychic energy. According to Freud, this causes a breakdown in the pleasure principle. Instead of seeking pleasure in the reduction of tension, the neurotic compulsively returns to the source of trauma, the unmetabolizable stimulus that simultaneously resists meaning and defeats denial. The patient feels compelled to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience, acting out fantasized causes and justifications, instead of remembering the real stimulus as something belonging to the past. s 12 BENJAMIN, supra note 1, at 242. 13 SANTNER, supra note 11, at 56-57. 14 JACQUES DERRIDA, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3, 12 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992) ("Here Montaigne is clearly distinguishing laws, that is to say droit, from justice. The justice of law, justice as law is not justice. Laws are not just as laws. One obeys them not because they are just but because they have authority."). 15 Id. at 14 ("Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground."). Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 51 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1995) ("Being in force without significance (Geltung ohne Bedeutung): nothing better describes the ban that our age cannot master than Scholem's formula for the status of law in Kafka's novel."). See SANTNER, supra note 11, at 54 (linking "pure necessity without meaning" with "the nothingness of revelation"). Trauma, it turns out, takes us beyond the pleasure principle into the realm of death, or perhaps more accurately, of death in life. Sick reason compels obsessive repetition of a repressed excess that resists expression. The patient is consequently transported to a realm of fantasy, for it is fantasy alone that now sustains any sense of order or consistency or place. Life is thus lost in the living.
In the face of death, and the terror that it holds for us, we encounter the metaphysical temptation. Sick reason seeks a way out of life, an escape from the terror of mortality. This is the fateful gift of metaphysical philosophy that Rosenzweig In the grip of metaphysical beatitude, sick reason is haunted by an insatiable phantom-a Dybuk, the soul's dark double, product of repressed forces. Dead, yet living, the phantom cries out to us, like Lucy in Bram Stoker's Dracula, "[c]ome to me .... My arms are hungry for you."'" But upon hearing her voice, our blood turns cold. There is "something of the tingling of glass when struck" in her diabolically sweet tones. It is the sweetness of eros captured by death. To yield to the call of the undead is to embrace death itself.
This retreat from life, this capture of the soul in the night of the Nought, lies at the heart of what Nietzsche described as the spirit of decadence, and what Freud diagnosed as the pathology of death anxiety. It is not the will to power, but rather the will to destruction.
As Nietzsche wrote, "[m]an would rather will nothingness than not will." 2 'quality' of evil is this very non-integratability.
) [ The fanatic exhibits a similarly decadent will. Here, too, we encounter the will to metaphysical beatitude. Rather than enter into the midst of life, the fanatic, like the nihilist, like the patient caught in denial, seeks to annihilate suffering for the sake of a world to come. The will to annihilation would rather will nothingness than not to will at all. Thus, the fanatic says "No" to life that is corrupt, stained with suffering and injustice. 23 Nietzsche well understood the fanatic will. "Love of one," he wrote, "is a barbarism: for it is exercised at the expense of all else. ' of fault .... The pain henceforth had a cause, a reason, an end, a why, and this meaning allowed the essential to be saved-that is, the will, at least a certain will, that which wills the meaning of suffering because first it considers suffering an accident, a stumbling block, something that is but should not be and that elsewhere, in another world, another life, another nature, would not be. This will, avid for meaning, we see, is at bottom a will for annihilation, a will that begins by saying "no" to existence, to our meaningless, immoral, unreasonable existence. Metaphysical beatitude in this sense is "only a death instinct. ' '26 Call it revolt, or call it the undeadness that comes of unresolved death anxiety. It is, at its core, the pathological spirit of resentment (what Nietzsche called ressentiment 27 ), a turning away from life.
We may recognize this nihilist revolt as the impulse behind the terrorist violence of which President Bush spoke, mistakenly identifying it with the will to power. We must not make that mistake. What the president referred to as the will to power is in reality the will to power in reverse.
The violent fantasies fueled by metaphysical beatitudeincluding the promise of metaphysical beatitude in the form of a final reckoning between eternal foes-take us down an inhuman path. We may fight to defend our way of life, but we cannot fight to root out fear and suffering. 28 
II. NIETZSCHE'S BEATITUDE
How far nihilistic thinking and the pathology of sick reason are from Nietzsche's thinking about the will to power. And here Rosenzweig and Freud are also allied in a similar kind of thinking. For theirs too is a response to sick reason, to the pathology of denial, against the paralysis of death anxiety. Their response calls 25 Id. at 225-26. 26 Id. at 222. 27 See NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER, supra note 23, para. 179, at 108-09 (describing as the "Masterstroke" of ressentiment its need "to deny and condemn the drive whose expression one is, continually to display, by word and deed, the antithesis of this drive"). 28 See Bush, supra note 5 ("Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them."). 29 ROSENZWEIG, REDEMPTION, supra note 20, at 3. "Man is not to throw off the fear of the earthly; he is to remain in the fear of death ..... Id. at 4. not for a flight from, or a defense against, life, but rather for what Santner describes as the "undeadening" of metaphysical fantasya de-cathexis or working through of the psyche's fixation upon the traumatic excess of unbound energy."
Only when the bond to metaphysical fantasy has been loosened may we learn to tarry with anxiety rather than take flight into a ghostly nothingness. Here is the gate through which we enter more deeply into life. But by what force are we impelled to cross over? What strength of will leads death-bound subjectivity to forge meaning in the very midst of life? But what is the will to power if not this very force?
Here lies the catalyst for supreme affirmation of this life from creative moment to creative moment. It is here that we encounter the deep joy of Nietzsche's beatitude. 31 The healthy will, the will to power, is the will not to nothingness, but to more life. It is the will that wills its own growth and vitality. It is the will to surpass itself, to be more. 32 "All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored. . ." Nietzsche tells us. And all joy "wants everything eternally the same.33 "To impose upon becoming the character of being .... to preserve a world of that which is, which abides .... That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being .... ,3
It is with good reason that Birault credits Heidegger's observation that "[t]he Will to Power is, in its essence and "I See SANTNER, supra note 11, at 22-23, 33.
31 Citing Plato's Phaedrus (regarding the delirium that comes from God as "winged thought"), Levinas comments: "Delirium here does not have an irrationalist significance; it is only a 'divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention."' LEVINAS, according to its internal possibility, the eternal return of the same." 35 Birault is also perspicacious in noting that Nietzsche's beatitude is the source, the beginning, rather than the goal, the phantasmal promised land, of creative thought and action. As Birault aptly puts it, "[t]he blissful man has made his peace with reality." 36 He has no need of, and no desire for the beyond, the unconditioned absolute. Rather than dissolve pain and suffering in some life beyond life, Nietzsche's tragic narrative affirms this life with all its suffering and vicissitudes.
The will to power culminates in the eternal return out of an excess of vitality and joy. Its affirmation is a thanking and a blessing. 37 As Birault writes, it:
proceeds from love, and love only, from an immense gratitude for what is, a gratitude that seeks to impress the seal of eternity on what is and what, for Nietzsche, is always only in becoming... . It is then that the will becomes love, without ceasing to be will and Will to Power. It is then that this love becomes the love of the necessary, "amor fati," without ceasing to be love and will for the contingency of the most contingent things. 3 "
III. LAW'S BEATITUDE
Nietzsche invites us to embrace life, to enhance the spirit of joyful creativity (the de-cathexis of traumatic excess) that links the will to power to meaning in the midst of life. This is what it means to heal sick reason. As Rosenzweig urges, "[1]et our personal experience, even though it change from instant to instant, be reality." 39 This is what it means to leave the fanciful realm of essences. "[A]ll turns into a black nothingness unless you color the world-yours are the tinges that illuminate it.""°B ut in uttering these words, Rosenzweig does more than merely echo Nietzsche's beatific excess, as expressed in the will to power. He takes a further step. He travels about, not alone with his will content to embrace the totality of things, 41 shall come face to face with my own Self. '42 With these words, Rosenzweig directs us toward a powerful gravitational field, 43 a field strong enough to bend the essentially aesthetic nature of Nietzsche's beatitude toward the ethical. 4 What is this powerful ethical force? It is the force unleashed in the utterance of a personal name. "Suddenly, hearing his name spoken," Rosenzweig writes, "man knows that he is himself. He heirs, or children-joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same."). Yet, once sounded, Agamben's irrefragable rebuke, anchored in the test case of Auschwitz, reverberates:
"One day or one night," a demon glides beside a survivor and asks: "Do you want Auschwiz to return again and again, innumerable times, do you want every instant, every single detail of the camp to repeat itself for eternity, returning eternally in the same precise sequence in which they took place?" This simple reformulation of the experiment suffices to refute it beyond all doubt ....
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, REMNANTS OF AUSCHWITZ: THE WITNESS AND THE ARCHIVE 99
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1999). 42 ROSENZWEIG, supra note 6, at 79. 43 One might suggest that what unfolds here is an attunement between two gravitational fields-between two minds, and two unconsciousnesses-the other's and the one who responds. As Santner puts it: "I want to propose that the ethics at the core of both psychoanalysis and the Judeo-Christian tradition (as interpreted by Rosenzweig) is an ethics pertaining to my answerability to my neighbor-with-an-unconscious." SANTNER, supra note 11, at 9. With regard to the receptive state of mind in question, Freud states: "Experience soon showed that the attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly suspended attention ... to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his own unconscious. AND COGNITION 64 (1999) (discussing ethics as the cultivation of a "know-how" concerning the unconscious). According to Varela, the "ek-static" state of mind (i.e., standing outside oneself in a selfless, non-intentional, non-deliberative, but active mindfulness) is what Buddhists refer to as wu wei. Id. at 32-33. According to Santner, this responsiveness to the other lies at "the heart of our very aliveness to the world." SANTNER, supra note 11, at 9. This notion of mindfulness resonates as well with Heidegger's sense of "mood" or "attunement." See HEIDEGGER, supra note 32, at 99 (describing mood as "a way of being attuned, and letting ourselves be attuned ...
[it] is precisely the basic way in which we are outside ourselves."). 44 Heidegger aptly notes that "rapture is the basic aesthetic state without qualification." HEIDEGGER, supra note 32, at 97. But the ethical force that Levinas describes disturbs our aesthetic enjoyment. By confronting me with the irreducible "destituteness" of the other's naked countenance, the ethical obligation (to pay heed) calls into question "my joyous possession of the world." LEVINAS, supra note 6, at 76. Hence, the surplus shifts from the totality of contingent things (the realm of beauty) to the infinity ("the inexhaustible surplus") of the face (the realm of the ethical). See id. at 207.
recognizes that he has the ability to begin again.... At each moment the future presents to man the gift of being present to himself." 45 But why speak of a gift of self-presence? Because the great gift of being oneself lies in its excess-in giving oneself away. 46 This is what it means to respond to the countenance of the other whom one meets. It marks the ever-present prospect of a redemptive moment, the moment in which justice irrupts into time, 47 the moment in which one responds to the one who calls. As Emmanuel Levinas has written, it is before the face of the other that we acquire moral consciousness. 48 Law can benefit from such thinking, 49 for law too is tempted by fantasies of flight and denial. Law too is susceptible to the pathology of metaphysical beatitude, particularly when it forgets (or denies) the violence at its core. We see such forgetfulness when law seeks refuge in certainty, in its compulsion to repeat the past, in the rigidity of precedent, which masks an unacceptable fear of illegitimacy. Then law rules with the blank stare of necessity-rather than a human countenance of meaning.
I believe we may find a way toward law's legitimacy by confronting and working through the symptoms of sick legal reason. Linking law's legitimacy to Nietzsche's beatitude is a first step on the path to health, which is to say, away from flight and fantasy toward life as it is. But I also wish to follow Rosenzweig's lead in taking an additional step. It is the step by which we bend the aesthetic of Nietzsche's beatitude toward the ethical. This is what happens when mindfulness, the beatific overflow of affirmation, encounters the summons of the other. 45 ROSENZWEIG, supra note 6, at 81, 82. 46 See BENNETT, supra note 31, at 80 ("Generosity is the active disposition of oneself. To think this way about ethics, that is, to focus on its aesthetic-affective dimensions, is thus to ask: Under what circumstances can such magnanimous sentiment or fullness of will arise?"). 47 See BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 2; LEVINAS, supra note 6, at [22] [23] ("Eschatology institutes a relation with being beyond the totality .... It is a relationship with a surplus always exterior to the totality... [It is as if] the concept of infinity.., were needed to express this transcendence with regard to totality .... "). 48 50 See SANTNER, supra note 11, at 61 ("The repetition of juridical precedent is, in other words, in a quite literal sense the compulsion to repeat. It is precisely this dimension of repetition compulsion that defines, for Benjamin, the sphere of 'mythical violence'...
.").
See also ROSENZWEIG, REDEMPTION, supra note 20, at 177 ("Law reckons with times, with a future, with duration. The commandment knows only the moment; it awaits the result in the very instant of its promulgation.").
Along this path of thinking, I believe we shall come to appreciate anew the impact of the philosophy of becoming upon twentieth century jurisprudence. It is a topic I can only lightly and most inadequately touch upon here. But my hope is that even this brief dalliance will at least set the stage for a theory of law's legitimacy that takes Nietzsche's beatitude as its point of departure.
Under the influence of Nietzsche's powerful ideas, philosophers of process and growth such as Henri Bergson, 1 Alfred North Whitehead, 52 and John Dewey 53 created an influential environment for jurists such as Benjamin Cardozo, Joseph C. Hutcheson, and Karl Llewellyn.
Indeed, the very same year that saw the publication of the works that I have been discussing (by Rosenzweig, Kafka, Benjamin, and Freud) also saw the publication of Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process.
Cardozo's book is a work of its time, steeped in ideas about immanence, growth, and creativity. For example, Cardozo writes:
All is fluid and changeable. There is an endless "becoming" ... In this perpetual flux, the problem which confronts the judge is in reality a twofold one: he must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle . . . . [H]e must then determine the path or direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is not to wither and die." Cardozo concludes his reflections with this observation: "I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation." 55 Released from the grip of law's formality, the judge is now primed to respond to the singular demands of facts. During the late 1920s, reflecting Cardozo's, among other influences, Karl Llewellyn would take a firm stand against law's systemization. Law's best hope, he argued, lay in a shift of focus toward "a wealth of illuminating facts." By thus drawing "closer to life," as he put it, Llewellyn sought to oppose law's rigidity. "If one observes a new fact situation," Llewellyn writes, "and is sensitive to its real-life meaning, then there is a sudden and (so to speak) ex post facto change in the meaning of one's prior life experience in that area, and thus a change of content in the words used to describe and 1976) (describing "situation-sense" as "the felt duty to justice which twins with the duty to the law ....
[T]he balanced shrewdness of the expert in the art."). According to Llewellyn, every fact pattern carries within it those "natural rules" which are "indwelling in the very circumstances of life." Id. at 122 (quoting Levin Goldschmidt, but the source might just as readily have been Francois G6ny in whose work the philosophy of immanence exerts an unmistakable influence).
See FRANCOIS GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans., 2d ed. 1954). 61 See BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 2, at 254 ("Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim.").
into the flux of time and events. This loosens law's rigidity and relieves it of its obsessive fantasy of control and systematic regularity. It also anchors law back in the present, relieving the pressures on law's past to predict law's future. 62 In the singularity of intuitive justice, the call of the personal name obtains heightened significance. As Rosenzweig states, " [w] ith the summons by the proper name, the word of revelation [God's command: 'Love me! Love thy neighbor!' 63 ] entered the real dialogue. With the proper name, the rigid wall of objectness has been breached." ' This rupture signals the possibility of redemptive justice. It is a possibility rooted in revelation and revelation put into practice. That is to say, it embodies the immanent aspect of affirmation that we find in Nietzsche's beatitude and which Birault correlates (correctly, in my view) with a profound love for being.
In psychoanalytic terms, beatitude operates as a means of cathecting (or bonding) the unbound, excessive energy of becoming. In this way, it is a form of mastery. 65 By mastering unbound energy the will to power renders it accessible and meaningful. As Jean Granier says, "[f]or Nietzsche, interpretation constantly takes the value of a creative imposition of form upon matter ....
For Nietzsche, interpretation is synonymous with imposing sense.... " 66 Yet, there is a profound omission in Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche seems content to let the will to power care for itself. He offers no help to one who asks what kind of community fosters or hinders such creative vitality within the individual. Nor does he speak to the question, what of the other?
To explore a theory of politics that links the will to power with a democratic polity one may productively turn to Walt Whitman," or more recently, to the work of George Kateb. 68 I shall not pursue this subject here. Suffice it to say that the recent history of aestheticized politics-from Marinetti to Himmler to Stalin to Mao-compellingly reminds us of the danger of this omission in Nietzsche's thought. 69 Metaphysical beatitude also robs us of our singularity by rendering us a part of the totalizing whole, whether it is the eternity of a culture, or the totalizing myth of the state. 7 " But the fantasies enacted in denial fail to reduce the pressure of the unbound, surplus psychic energy that produced them. Indeed, the reasons that purport to explain the return of repressed fears and anxieties, or of unwanted desires, end up reconstituting the structure of the fantasy that operates as a means of defense. Metaphysical beatitude thus remains trapped in a cycle of endless violence and sacrifice.
By contrast, redemptive justice, like Benjamin's messianic moment, "blasts a specific life out of the era or a specific work out of the lifework." 7 1 It reclaims the singular within us. It also calls upon us to be taken up in the encounter with the other, the nearest one, the neighbor.
Bending Nietzsche's beatitude toward the ethical is an act of affirmation not simply in the face of all that is and becomes, but more fundamentally in response to the face of the other who summons our response. In this way, redemptive justice activates revelation and moves it into life. 72 This is the way of nonmetaphysical ethics. It originates from the overflow (or ek-static) affirmation captured by the gravitational field generated by the countenance of the other who summons us by our proper name. That summons is tragic in its sacrificial renunciation of the third, COLLECTED PROSE 929-94 (1982 69 This omission infects Heidegger's thought as well. It is the error that comes with assigning pre-eminent status to ontology; by dissolving beings into Being philosophy loses its grip on the ethical. As Levinas notes: "Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under the obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny." LEVINAS, supra note 6, at 46-47. 70 See, e.g., ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1946 but what it (realistically) lacks in regard to "the other other," 73 it gains in the quality or authenticity of its practice. Nonmetaphysical ethics is neither abstract nor total. The fanatic's willingness to sacrifice countless unencountered others for the sake of an idea lies outside its purview. 74 When we turn away from metaphysics, the death-amplifying effect of unresolved (unassimilable) trauma may give way to the life-enhancing affirmation of the other. The legitimating source of law's command lies here, in the mutual exchange of respect between equals. 75 This is the essential precondition for ethical discourse; it is the condition that makes justice possible. The immanent, and ultimately contingent, nature of this ethical exchange (for nothing guarantees our response to the other's summons) authorizes judgment and roots it in time. Yet, its authority resists replication. Historical precedent remains a pale trace of its originary ethical calling. The urge to safeguard the authority of judgment, to take it out of the moment in order to secure the future, marks law's (violent) self-preserving/selfreplicating impulse. This is what Benjamin refers to as mythic violence. 6 It reflects a revolt against the imminent decay of immanent justice as it pours itself into the mold of repeatable law. As Rosenzweig writes: "Law reckons with times, with a future, 73 See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH 68 (David Wills trans., 1995) ("1 cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others. Every other (one) is every (bit) other.... every one else is completely or wholly other.").
74 Contrast Shigalov's utopian tyranny (an eerie premonition of Stalinism) in Dostoyevsky's The Possessed:
He offers as a final social solution the division of mankind into two uneven categories. One-tenth will be granted individual freedom and full rights over the remaining nine-tenths .... Gradually ... they will attain a state of primeval innocence, something akin to the original paradise on earth.... The procedure. .. which would deprive nine-tenths of mankind of their free will.., is based on data gathered from the natural sciences and is very logical. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 23, at 385.
75 See LEVINAS, supra note 6, at 200 ("To manifest oneself in attending one's own manifestation is to invoke the interlocutor and expose oneself to his response and his questioning."); LEVINAS, COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 18, at [43] [44] ("Respect is a relationship between equals. Justice presupposes this original equality."). At the same time, however, the ethical response in itself remains asymmetrical: "[E]thics primarily signifies obligation toward the other ... it leads to the Law and to gratuitous service .... Id. at 183 n.11. See also LEVINAS, supra note 6, at 215-16.
76 BENJAMIN, supra note 1, at 249.
[T]he mythic manifestation of immediate violence shows itself fundamentally identical with all legal violence .... Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythic violence is confronted by the divine .... If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates ....
with duration. The commandment knows only the moment; it awaits the result in the very instant of its promulgation." 77 Law ramifies itself in fear of the unstable contingencies of its ethical origin and legitimating source. It turns against affirmative beatitude the way the neurotic shrinks in horror from his or her (impermissible) pleasure. 78 The unassimilable excess of desire thus repressed, symptomized in fantasies of recurring trauma, leads to the "undeadness" of law, which is to say, to metaphysical beatitude and mythical violence. 79 At the same time, absent the revelatory authority of contingent justice, Nietzsche's affirmative beatitude risks a "strange fire," 8 a lawless passion-all too familiar fuel for the machinery of fascism's aestheticization of the political. 8 Conversely, if Nietzsche's excess of meaning risks a lawless passion, in the shadow-land of disenchantment law's validity risks exceeding its meaning. This is the condition of Kafka's law in a thoroughly disenchanted world. 82 The contingency of law's beatitude is the price we pay for law's legitimacy. 84 The case involves a claim of negligence. There has been an accident. A train, with one of its doors open, violently lurched around a bend of track on a bridge. A passenger, named Herbert Wagner, is thrown out of the car. The train continues on across the bridge and then stops. Plaintiff, Herbert's cousin, gets onto the track to search for his missing kin. It is nighttime, and he will walk four hundred and forty-five feet until he arrives at the site of his cousin's fall. I'll let Cardozo continue the narration: "Reaching the bridge, he had found upon a beam his cousin's hat, but nothing else. About him, there was darkness. He missed his footing, and fell." 85 It is no trifling matter to note the human drama that is captured by Cardozo's exquisite prose. But let us pass on to the legal issue. The court below ruled that a claim of negligence against the railroad could not be sustained by this plaintiff. The problem lies with proximate cause. Relevant precedent requires a direct connection, reasonably close both in time and space, tying defendant's carelessness to plaintiff's injury. Here, however, plaintiff's choice to walk 445 feet on a track at nighttime was deemed to break the necessary causal chain. According to the court below, his death was not caused by the same carelessness that had led to his cousin's death, namely the lurch and the open door, but rather by plaintiff's own decision to set out upon the tracks and conduct his own rather lengthy investigation.
Cardozo disagrees. "Danger invites rescue," he writes. 86 "The cry of distress is the summons to relief .... The emergency begets arise directly and spontaneously out of wisdom. It is as if one were born already knowing how to play the violin and had to practice with great exertion in order to remove the habits that prevented one from displaying that virtuosity. [Vol. 24:2 the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had .... "87 Rhetorically as well as substantively, Cardozo foreshortens plaintiff's action. This foreshortening of causation is psychologically justified, Cardozo says, because "the human mind acts with celerity which it is sometimes impossible to measure. ' "" It is also ethically justified, since plaintiff was obliged to walk "more than four hundred feet in going to Herbert's aid." 89 Two words stand out here: Cardozo's use of the term "deliverer" and his repeated utterance of the proper name, "Herbert." Herbert is the summons. It is his countenance, suddenly lost from view, not the utterance of actual words, which constitutes the "cry of distress" that prompts plaintiff's act of deliverance.
Id
In Wagner, Cardozo takes us into the midst of life. Lived experience, rhetorically evoked, psychologically described, and ethically justified, bears the weight of judgment.
We may recognize in Cardozo's response to the facts presented in Wagner another kind of summons. It is the summons of redemptive justice. Like plaintiff's response to Herbert's inaudible cry, Cardozo too responds to the immanent possibility of revelation and revelation put into practice. One might say that his judgment recapitulates in law the human response to the summons to relief that he has been called upon to judge.
It is my contention that the sincere pursuit of this aspirational ideal in everyday judgments serves as a warrant for law's legitimacy. It demonstrates the legal implications of Nietzsche's beatitude when it is drawn into the gravitational field generated by the countenance of the other, when the aesthetic turns toward the ethical.
CONCLUSION
The will to power is not the source of evil that President Bush made it out to be shortly after 9/11. Rather, its opposite, metaphysical beatitude, the flight from life, is the danger to which we should be alerted. Nietzsche's will to power is an expression of joyous affirmation of this life, with all its contingencies and vicissitudes, here and now.
But if Nietzsche's beatitude is a worthy springboard to law's 87 Id. at 438. 88 Id. 89 Id.
legitimacy, it is not enough. Law's beatitude, as a basis for legitimacy, requires an additional step, namely: the affirmation,. out of plenitude, of the other close by, the neighbor, the one who summons us, and to whom we respond by the singularity of the proper name. This response marks a shift from the purely aesthetic affirmation of Nietzsche's beatitude (love of what is in its totality) to the ethical aesthetic of law's beatitude (acknowledging the irreducible imperative of the naked countenance of the other before us). Therein lies the aspiration of law's beatitude, an aspiration that warrants law's legitimacy.
EPILOGUE
"And Nadab and Abihu, the sons of Aaron, offered strange fire before the Lord, which he commanded them not." ' "One of law's usual functions is to hold off the Messiah." '1 The story of Leviticus tells of metaphysical beatitude. It is a story of "strange fire"-a lawless excess, an enchantment without validity: On the eighth day, Moses called Aaron and his sons to make a sacrifice, which was done with all propriety. And "there came a fire out from before the Lord," and the people fell on their faces in awe and wonder. But then Aaron's eldest sons took some of the fire and mixed it with incense "and offered strange fire before the Lord, which he commanded them not. And the fire went out from the Lord and devoured them, and they died." 92 In psychoanalytic terms, one might say that this narrative describes a state of over-cathected desire. It leads to unlawful enchantment, and the ultimate rebuke of divine violence. To avoid such fatal consequences, law remains necessary even (especially) in the face of messianic possibility. This is what Robert Cover has referred to as "lawful Messianism." 93 We have also seen that when the excess of uncathected desire cannot be absorbed, it risks becoming traumatic, the springboard to nihilistic fantasy. Repressed desire finds its outlet in an artificial death, a state of undeadness, in which the intolerable taint of the here and 91 See COVER, supra note 62, at 204.
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